After all, although the polygraph cannot be considered to be definitive proof -- it cannot be used as evidence in the court of law, for example -- it is a cheap way to identify and eliminate major threats to security. Nevertheless, the notorious instances in which the polygraph provided counterintelligence operations with unreliable information seem to loom over the head of much of the information that is gathered through them. Very routinely, the process of determining the reliability of informants in foreign agencies becomes paralyzed even after a polygraph has been administered. Typically, this has occurred within the CIA following apparent breaches of security, or instances in which it was never clearly determined whether an informant was providing legitimate information: "In the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, the CIA Counterintelligence Staff was faced with assessing whether he was a legitimate defector who changed his mind or a planet who intended to redefect from the beginning." It was eventually determined, after several years of investigation into the incident, that Yurchenko was a real defector who was put under pressured from the Soviet Union to return; this conclusion was in agreement with the polygraph administered to him.

Still, the polygraph, though relied upon heavily in the United States, is avoided almost altogether as a recruitment tool abroad: "They believe the polygraph is subjective, that it intrudes too fear into a person's private life, that it makes mistakes, and that people can be trained to beat it. Furthermore, critics of the United States' use...

This is because, in some ways, it relives the administrator of any responsibility for security breeches. In other words, if it is beaten by someone trained in how to beat it, then the officer who interpreted the results of the test is never held accountable -- is was somehow the device's fault. This, according to the critics, can lead to additional paralysis in internal investigations.
Overall, the polygraph is a very useful tool -- perhaps the most useful tool -- in any counterintelligence investigation. However, the critics are quite correct in warning of its flaws; over reliance upon it can potentially undo all of the good that it can do. It is not an infallible mechanism; however, it definitively is an excellent first-wave method of minimizing risk in recruitment and in intelligence breeches.

Works Cited

Codevilla, Angelo. 1992. Informing Statecraft. New York: the Free Press.

Godson, Roy. 1995. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards. Washington: Brassey's.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. 1999. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Fourth Edition. Boulder: Westview Press.

Codevilla, Angelo. 1992. Informing Statecraft. New York: the Free Press. Page 150.

Codevilla 150.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. 1999. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Fourth Edition. Boulder: Westview Press. Page 338.

Godson, Roy. 1995. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards. Washington: Brassey's. Page 227.